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Abstract:   The attention of both the research community and the popular press has begun
to shift from a traditional focus on production jobs and toward management positions in
part because of a perception that a fundamental change is underway in the management
ranks. Unlike the temporary layoffs of production workers that were historically driven by
business cycles, the changes in management job security seem to be permanent and, in
large measure, driven by development inside the firm. The most important of these forces
appear to be changes in the structure of management and in the organization of work
processes.
The authors use a unique set of data to examine the structure of management jobs among a
sample of companies and observe how those jobs have changed over time. They examine
changes in the skill requirements of jobs by functional area and by level in the organization,
changes in the "shape" of the organization chart - the distribution of employees across
management job titles - and changes in compensation for these jobs. The data were
obtained from Hay Associates, and it included the internal organization of management
jobs for 11 life insurance companies. The authors see a sharp expansion in the proportion of
line workers, absolute declines in the number of top management positions, and only
modest growth in the number of middle managers and supervisors. As a result the
organization chart has changed dramatically in these companies, becoming considerably
flatter. The "span of control" has increased for every level of the organization and especially
for first level management. 
If the widening of the supervisory span of control resulted from taking decision making and
responsibility from supervisors and pushing it down to line workers, it does not seem to
have increased the average skill requirements of the exempt line workers.  Skill
requirements for the other levels rose over the period, especially for top management
positions. Overall, the average level of skill in the sample fell substantially between 1986
and 1992 (even though skills rose in two of the four levels) because of a sharp shift in the
distribution of employment away from management and toward line positions.Introduction
The attention of both the research community and the popular press has begun to shift from
a traditional focus on production jobs and toward management positions in part because of a
perception that fundamental change is underway in the management ranks. Perhaps the most
examined issue has been the reduction in job security experienced by managers (Cappelli, 1992).
Unlike the temporary layoffs of production workers that were historically driven by business
cycles, the changes in management job security seem to be permanent and, in large measure,
driven by developments inside the firm (see Pfeffer and Baron, 1988). The most important of
these forces appear to be changes in the structure of management and in the organization of work
processes.
We use a unique set of data to examine the structure of management jobs among a sample
of companies and observe how those jobs have changed over time. In particular, we examine
changes in the skill requirements of jobs by functional area and by level in the organization,
changes in the “shape” of the organizational chart -- the distribution of employees across
management job titles -- and changes in compensation for these jobs. That is, are managers
becoming more or less skilled, are hierarchies becoming steeper or flatter, and is compensation
becoming more or less equal within companies? The results present one of the first systematic
attempts to examine how management job structures are changing in the U.S. economy. They
suggest growing inequality in skills and compensation and widening spans of control in the
management ranks. A final question addressed is whether these changes have an effect on
overall company performance.
The Insurance Industry
Studies of the structure of jobs in the U.S. have tended to focus on manufacturing, perhaps
because it has historically been seen as central to the economy, especially its effects on business
cycles, and because of the volatility of employment in it. The financial services industry
represents the other end of the spectrum with respect to volatility, though it is also an important
part of the U.S. economy.
1One of the most important aspects of financial services for the
purposes of this study, however, is that a disproportionate number of its jobs are white-collar.
Nationally, 18.9 percent of all workers in the private sector held supervisory jobs while 27.5
percent of workers in the financial services sector fell in this category (U.S. Department of
Labor, 1992). Employees in financial services, therefore, were more typically managers, were
higher-paid, and had greater job security, typically in organizations with extensive management
hierarchies and elaborate systems of progression.
1It has traditionally been the highest-paid industry in the U.S. (current fourth highest; U.S. Department of
Labor, 1992) and has seemed to be virtually recession-proof with respect to job security, at least when compared to other
industries. For example, when national unemployment rates were 7.2% in 1985 and 7.4% in 1992, they were 3.5% and
4.5% respectively for the financial services industry, and 2.6% and 3.8% respectively for financial services managers
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993). Employment has grown steadily over the past decades with only a slight drop
between 1990 and 1992 (from 6,729,000 employees back to 6,672,000). About seven percent of the U.S. workforce
is in financial services which includes finance, insurance, and real estate. Together these services account for about 17
percent of the gross national product in the U.S. (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1993; U.S. Department of Labor,
1992).Within financial services, we are focusing on the life insurance industry which has been a
very stable segment of financial services and has a higher proportion of supervisory employees.
The percent of employees in supervisory positions in the life insurance industry is extraordinarily
high and has declined only gradually since 1966 (from 42 percent to 40 percent over a 15 year
period) (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992). This is slightly different from the financial industry
which experienced an increase in percentage of supervisory employees over the same
period, but the financial industry as a whole started out with a much smaller percentage of
supervisory employees (20 percent in 1966) and ended twelve percentage points less than the life
insurance segment of the industry (28 percent in 1989) (U.S. Department of Labor, 1990).
What this suggests is that managers in the insurance industry have always had a smaller span
of control than their counterparts in other areas of financial services such as banking. One
reason why life insurance companies are an interesting industry in which to examine
management jobs is because such an exceptionally large proportion of all its jobs are in
management.
Another fact that makes the insurance industry interesting is that, unlike the savings and loan
industry and, to a lesser extent, banking and investments, the life insurance industry has not been
rocked by changes in regulation or by developments in foreign markets; nor has it experienced
the boom and bust cycles that real estate has experienced. One reason to look at insurance for
a study of management jobs, then, is because it has experienced relatively few unique shocks
from the outside environment: The changes in management jobs here have therefore been driven
largely by changes within the companies themselves. These developments are likely to translate
well to other industries regardless of their market circumstances.
Managers in the insurance industry have been concerned with developments that also concern
managers in other industries. Aging populations, increases in divorce rates, increases in dual
income families, and other similar national phenomena have affected both the products and the
employment practices of life insurance companies (National Underwriter, 1987). Changes in
technology and its acceptance have seen an increase in Local Area Networks (LANs), voice-mail,
imaging systems, and electronic data transfer in the insurance industry just as it has happened
in other industries (National Underwriter,  1993). New theories about management have swept
the insurance industry as broadly as they have other industries, with advice on Total Quality
Management and reengineering being abundant in the industry publications (Hall, 1992;
Knowles, 1990; Scites, 1993; Rohm, 1993; Bucker, 1992; Helldorfer and Daly, 1993).
As in the rest of the economy, managers in the insurance industry are facing an increase in
competition, customers who are more sensitive to price and quality issues, shorter time horizons
for investors, and market segmentation (Brooks, 1987; McClure, 1992; National Underwriter,
1987). As a result, managers who once had only a few products aimed at a mass market now
have multiple products and multiple markets. Competition has increased to include banks and
brokerage houses as people have come to view life insurance as just one of a broad spectrum
of financial investments. This change affects not only the job of the marketing or sales manager;
every aspect of the organization is affected. Underwriting managers must develop expertise in
the new products and new markets; data processing managers must develop new systems to
2provide comparisons
payment procedures,
of different packages; accounting managers must devise new billing and
and so on.
The Changing Nature of Management Jobs
In the 1980s, the job of a life insurance manager was very much like that of a manager in
any manufacturing organization with a production line, except that the production staff consisted
of clerical workers processing reams of paper and producing insurance policies. Managers had
to be sure that each functional unit completed its tasks effectively and efficiently and passed on
the work to the next unit in a timely fashion. Managers could evaluate individual performance
in terms of relatively equivalent inputs and outputs. Career ladders were defined hierarchically,
and steep hierarchies were needed to ensure coordination among the various functional areas.
As a manager in one of the companies we examined reported, “There was a lot of fat back in
those days -- it was easy to make money then.”
2 The skills needed from managers were
planning, delegation, motivation, evaluation, coordination, and control.
Now, insurance management jobs are more like those in lean production manufacturing
organizations, where teams of workers are responsible for production and the manager is
responsible for leadership. One human resources manager told us, “We reengineered the way
we did the work. There is more accountability, consolidation. Instead of doing only one piece,
you do the whole thing. For example, we used to have four people in accounts payable -
accounting, operations, accounts payable and bookkeeping. Now it’s broken out by client area.
We have billing and accounting teams - western, northern, southern - to respond to agencies.
This gives each person a career path as their levels of experience increase. ” Different skill sets
are needed for managers to coordinate these independent teams. “We replaced our traditional
supervisor with a team leader. This person does not do hiring or firing but coordinates
workflow and motivates members. They may sit in on interviews and advise the manager of
discipline problems as well. ” One manager said “managers’ jobs are not as well-defined as they
were. ” Managers are having to demonstrate more “soft” skills. The skills required to motivate
a team are different than those needed to motivate individuals in an authoritarian environment.
In one company, for example, the managers are responsible for a program to teach the agents
the values of the home office and ethical sales conduct.
One manager near retirement said, “If I were starting again as a manager, I would have a
more intense, focused attitude toward the business-- more responsibility for trying to accomplish
goals. I’m working harder now and sleeping less than ever in my life. ” In particular, our
interviews suggest that managers who were comfortable with only a few direct subordinates are
now having to juggle the concerns of multiple staff members. In an era of downsizing and
rightsizing, one manager who was responsible for cutting staff reported, “managers are having
to deal with the emotional stuff that goes with laying off people. ” Managers who used time at
work or number of applications coded to evaluate individual performance are finding that teams
2Uncited quotations are from managers in the industry.
3do not break work down into easily meterable jobs. One manager who had expected regular
promotions reported that her career progression had slowed, saying, “there isn’t a whole lot of
movement in managerial careers these days -- people move between product lines, these are the
fast trackers they want to give exposure to, but people don’t move up so fast.” Another
observed that “more people are making lateral moves, broadening experience, preparing
themselves for the next step. ” At least at the first level of supervision, managers are finding that
the rules of the game with respect to compensation are changing. According to one of the
compensation managers, “now technical people can be rated as high or higher than a manager,
and receive the same or more pay. ”
As in the rest of the economy, changes in technology affect how managers manage. One
manager reported, “We are leveraging with systems. We use expert systems, electronic claims....
Human Resources has everything on systems now. We just put in an on-line salary increase
system. It has a lot of built-in edits telling the manager what actions are outside of policy,
cutting down on paperwork for the compensation staff.”
Managers all over the country are having to face these demographic, organizational, and
technological changes in their workplaces. Our data allow us to see how the changes have
played out in the insurance industry, and, because the insurance industry is so much more
protected than the rest of the economy, we believe that our results provide a conservative
assessment of how change is taking place elsewhere.
One characteristic of the insurance industry which differentiates it from other industries is its
use of independent agents for its retail sales (see box). The numbers of employees reported in
SIC code 64, “Insurance agents, brokers, and service,”
3 is frequently greater than the reported
employment of life insurance companies as a whole (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992),
which suggests that agents make up a large segment of the industry. The supervisory ratios
reported above from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) data do not include independent
agents or the work they perform. And because independent agents often sell more than one
product, it is not possible to break down the numbers in these categories to determine the full-
time equivalents of the number of subordinates for life insurance managers. When the agents,
brokers, etc. are included along with the employees of insurance companies, however, 20.3
percent of all workers held jobs in the category of executives, administrators and managers in
1990 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1990). The trend is toward fewer independent agents (a 14
percent decrease from 1987-1992) and more career agents, further changing the jobs of managers
from that of negotiating with independent contractors to developing long-term loyalty from
employees (Dauer, 1992).
Bureau of Labor Statistics data suggest that over 50 percent of all insurance workers are in
administrative support positions, 20 percent are in executive, administrative, and managerial
3Agents contract to sell insurance and provide service on policies. Brokers negotiate with carriers to write
policies for specific organizations or individuals. Service organizations provide such services as data gathering,
education, and consulting specifically for the insurance industry or a part thereof.
4positions, 16 percent are in marketing and
sales, and 7.5 percent hold professional or
technical positions (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1990). The BLS projects a
change in the distribution of employees
among these classes over the next 15 years
with sharp increases in the professional
(+46.3 percent) and technical (+44.6
percent) areas and decreases in the areas of
typing (-18 percent), filing (-3.9 percent),
and bookkeeping (-5 percent). Executive,
administrative, and managerial jobs are
projected to increase by 28.2 percent
between 1990 and 2005, including a 26
percent increase in general managers and
top executives, slightly greater than the
21.8 percent increase projected for overall
industry employment (U. S. Department of
Labor, 1990a). As the data in Appendix
A suggest, there has been a general trend
in the 1990s toward a smaller number of
insurance companies with more employees
per company.
These general trends in industry
employment suggest a picture of
reasonable stability: slow but steady
growth in overall employment and only
modest changes in the management ranks.
INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS
An important characteristic of the insurance industry is that
it has always made extensive use of contract sales managers
-- general agents -- who are not employees of the company.
This is known as the agency  model of insurance human
resource management where independent insurance agents
handle many of the marketing and retail functions of the
business. One reason why the supervisory ratio or span of
control noted above is so small in this industry is because
the retailing operation, which in most industries accounts for
many low-level employees who need supervision, is handled
outside of the company. Sales managers in insurance
companies that use the agency model are not company
employees, and neither are their sales agents. Under this
model, the agents are under contract to the general agent,
not the insurance carrier. The branch model, in contrast,
uses company employees as sales managers. Under this
model, the salespeople are under contract to the company,
and in some companies, they are company employees.
Some companies use both models, selling individual policies
through agents and group policies through employees. See
Lederer, (1971) for a more detailed explanation of these
arrangements. For an interesting sociological account of
the evolution of these models, see Zelizer (1978), who posits
that the use of person-to-person contact was necessary to
overcome the early view of life insurance as tempting fate or
putting a price on human life. The current shift to more
branch models may well be attributable to seeing life
insurance as another investment.
These projections are based on extrapolating industry employment trends, however, and will not
foresee any radical change in the structure of employment. We need more detailed information
about changes in the internal organization of companies in order to understand how management
jobs may be evolving in the future.
The Hay Data
We obtained detailed data from Hay Associates on the internal organization of management
jobs for eleven life insurance companies, and these data are used in
- the analyses that follow.
Hay Associates is well-known for its system of job analysis and evaluation which begins with
detailed and consistent measures of job requirements --skills. The measure of skill used by Hay
is similar to that used in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and captures the autonomy and
complexity of jobs which are issues central to academics. The submeasures of the Hay scale
are grouped into three classifications: “Know How,” which measures the capabilities,
knowledge, and techniques needed to do the job ranked according to their complexity; “Problem-
5Solving,” which measures how well defined and predictable job tasks are; and “Accountability,”
which measures autonomy in decision making. These measures get at the autonomy-complexity
dimension of skill that concerns fields such as psychology and sociology.
4
There is considerable debate about the validity of any measure of skill (see Levin,
Rumberger, and Finnan [1990] for a summary) but the Hay measure appears to be at least as
valid a measure as any others proposed.
5 Further, the Hay measures have wide-spread
influence on how jobs are structured and evaluated in the economy as a whole and, in that sense,
have good external validity. During the 1980s, for example, Hay claimed that 2 million
employees were in jobs evaluated by its system, including those in most of the country’s largest
corporations, and comparisons by non-Hay firms with these establishments extend the influence
of the Hay system even further. The fact that much of Hay’s original work in developing the
system was in financial services may make it especially appropriate for a study of the insurance
industry (Henderson, 1985).
The most important point about the Hay measures for our purposes is that they are reliable
and consistent over time. They have been constant at Hay for decades and, more important, are
applied consistently across establishments. Hay staff receive considerable training in applying
the measures, they visit the clients, conduct the job analysis on the jobs being examined, and
the results are then checked for reliability by a central office. Indeed, the product that Hay
ultimately sells its clients is the assurance that its information is comparable over time and across
organizations.
6 The various skill measures are then combined into a single measure, the job
evaluation score, which represents an aggregate assessment of the demands associated with the
job.
7 Comparison of these scores over time makes it possible to estimate changes in skill. In
addition to the skill measures, we also examine data on employment across job levels (i.e.,
position in the management hierarchy) and on compensation for each position.
4This description of the Hay system is based on materials provided by Hay and interviews with Hay consultants.
Bellak (1984) provides a good summary of the Hay system.
5Other proxies for skill, such as education, suffer from lack of consistency and from contamination by other
sociological factors. Measures that examine the characteristics of workers are in general a poor proxy for skill
requirements as they may vary -- depending on labor market circumstances -- independent of any changes in the actual
demand for skill. The Hay measures, by evaluating the job and not the person, avoid this problem. Hay analysts,
carefully trained to ensure consistency, further enhance this measure.
6The reliability tests appear to be qualitative -- questioning “out-liers,” for example, or unusual patterns in the
data. The incentives are clearly for Hay to be consistent over time in its methods. Long-term clients (the bulk of their
business) know which of their jobs have remained constant, and it would be painfully obvious if Hay generated different
job evaluations for those positions over time.
7 The separate measures are combined through use of a constant algorithm that weights the various measures
and creates an index from them. Unfortunately, only the final job evaluation total is available (measures of the separate
components were not retained), and it is impossible to recreate the separate component scores from the aggregate score.
While some might argue that this algorithm neglects shifts in importance of various skills over time, we maintain that
this is still the best measure available to address this question (see below).
6The Sample of Companies: The eleven firms used here can not be identified for reasons of confidentiality, but it
is clearly a sample of convenience. Like all longitudinal samples, this one is censored in the technical sense in
that companies that began business during the time period were excluded. (None of the companies originally in
the data base failed during this period.) In practical terms, this censoring may not be much of au issue for external
validity given that “start-up” insurance companies are virtually non-existent.
Three types of life insurance organizations are represented in our sample: mutual, stock, and fraternal. In 1991,
mutual insurance companies represented only 5.6 percent of the companies in the life insurance industry, while
they composed 55 percent of our sample. However, the mutuals, which are usually older and larger than stock
companies, had 46.1 percent of the assets of all life insurance companies. The companies in our sample are
therefore representative of the insurance industry, although not necessarily of the average company in that
industry.
The companies in our sample are also disproportionately larger and older than the norm. The average life
insurance company has around 250 employees (American Council of Life Insurance, 1993), while the average size
of companies in our sample is around 2,000. Again, the larger companies have a disproportionate share of the
market which again makes our sample more representative of the industry than of companies in that industry.
Because our sample concentrates on mutual companies, it is also older than the industry average: Only four of the
companies in this sample were founded in this century, and all of them before 1920. Forty-three percent of all
mutuals were founded before 1926, as opposed to 6 percent of all insurance companies. Population ecology
research has found insurance companies to experience competition as exhibiting an inverted-U shaped relationship
between density and founding rates (Ranger-Moore, et al., 1991), perhaps explaining the age of companies in our
sample. Haveman (1993) also finds that larger savings and loans are more capable of taking advantage of
opportunities to enter new markets, a result that may well translate to the larger insurance companies in our
sample.
Regionally, this sample also resembles the distribution of mutuals, having 45 percent in the midwest, 18 percent
in the northeast, and 27 percent in the south, as compared to 51 percent in the midwest, 30 percent in the
northeast, and 13 percent in the south for the entire population of mutuals. Stock companies are more common
in the west (40 percent) and south (36 percent), with some representation in the midwest (16 percent) and northeast
(8 percent) (American Council of Life Insurance, 1993; Lederer, 1971).
Life insurance is the predominant product for these firms, although some also have health or long-term care
product lines, and all market annuities. They are mostly in Best’s financial size categories VII, VIII, or IX (Best’s
1992). Most follow the general agency model for sales, while a few use the branch model for at least some of
their business. (Details of the firm characteristics are presented in Appendix B.) As discussed earlier, our data
relate only to the employees of these firms and do not include sales agents who are not employees of the
companies. All but three firms increased their numbers of employees over the six year period on average at about
the same rate as the industry as a whole. One which did not was acquired by another firm in 1993. Data on their
performance show that they are slightly more efficient than the average life insurance company, no doubt because
no “failed” firms are in the sample. Appendix B provides additional details about the sample.
The eleven companies chosen here are all clients of Hay Associates, and it is worth considering whether there is
anything about being a Hay client that would select in firms with particular characteristics. For example, there
has recently been a move in many companies away from using detailed job descriptions in some firms. These
descriptions and structures are a strength of the Hay system. Possibly firms that have these broader jobs might
have other distinctive characteristics as well -- such as other innovations in work organization -- and would be less
likely to use Hay’s services. The movement toward broader jobs was not underway in 1986, however, and no
firms left the sample since then. The fact noted above that they are slightly more efficient than the industry
average suggests that this may not a sample of firms that are lagging new developments.
7We have data on all of the Hay-classified positions for each company in our sample (see box
describing sample) at three points in time: 1986, 1989, and 1992. These positions include all
but the lowest-level non-exempt jobs which are excluded from our calculations.
8 Jobs are
grouped according to four “Levels” with respect to the organizational chart or hierarchy: The
first level is for top executives who manage policy (e.g., Group Vice-Presidents); the second
level is for general managers who direct other managers or supervisors (e.g., heads of a division
within a conglomerate); the third level is for supervisors who directly manage individual workers
(e.g., head of a department like Accounts Receivable); the fourth level is for exempt, non-
supervisory positions (e.g., accountant jobs). Again, non-exempt jobs are excluded from the
data. We know the Hay points and the total employment for each job in the sample as well as
the base and total compensation and functional skill (e.g., underwriting, data processing,
accounting, sales) used in that job. These data give us a rich picture of the internal labor market
in these organizations. Since we also know the identities of the companies, we have
supplemented this picture with additional data about each firm’s performance.
Analyses with the Hay Data
Structure: Perhaps the most important use of these data is to see whether and how the size
and shape of the organizational chart is changing. Are we in fact seeing a “flattening” of the
organizational structure in companies like these -- is the proportion of lower-level employees
rising as responsibility is pushed from higher to lower levels of the organization? Further, is
there a change in the distribution of employment by functional area that reflects new
developments in the power and importance of different fields?
The practitioner journals report some changes in organizational structure in insurance
companies such as centralization of field activities to central or regional offices (King, 1991 on
sales expertise; Hoyt, 1992 on customer service; Dauer, 1991 on adjustment activities). They
also suggest a stronger emphasis on certain functional areas, such as customer service (McGrath,
1992). There is similar evidence of change for the banking industry’s line workers, suggesting
that changes in management levels and functional areas are important in both segments of the
financial services industry (see, e.g., Bird, 1991 on flatter organizational structures; Violano,
1990 and Klein, 1992 on reduction of tellers; and Lunt, 1992 on increased customer service).
A study of insurance industry adjusters shows that changes in the span of control associated with
the decision to delegate work were driven solely by the work load of the manager. [The
decision to delegate, however, was associated with improved job performance (Leana, 1986)].
The picture for the 1980s is one of geographically dispersed staff, with much of the
responsibility for sales, claims adjustment, and customer service performed by agents of the
company at remote locations. We see a steep hierarchy, with experts in various specialties
assigned to each of the geographic locations. The picture for the 1990s is very different.
Hierarchy is flattening. More of the functions have been brought in house and centralized.
8As with most organizations, the non-exempt staff represent more than 50 percent of the employees of these
companies, so we should be careful not to conclude anything about the whole companies based on these data. However,
since our focus here is on management jobs, the lack of data on non-exempt employees is not critical.
8Technology (800-numbers, laptops, modems) is being used to bring expertise close to the
customer without having to move the experts.
Skill: A second and closely related issue is how skill requirements might be changing for
jobs. Whether jobs are being upskilled or deskilled is a central issue both for academic research
and for policy. The Hay data are uniquely suited for addressing whether skill requirements are
changing and have been used for this purpose with other jobs (Cappelli, 1993). The deskilling
of one job, for example, may come about because of a transfer of requirements to other jobs,
so it is important to examine the entire job structure within firms in order to identify such
transfers.
Most analyses of changing skill requirements in companies and in the economy as a whole
rely simply on changes in the distribution of employees across jobs. With these data, in
contrast, we can examine how skill requirements are changing for individual jobs and then add
data on changes in employment across occupations to see how they are changing for the
organization as a whole. It is also possible, for example, that each job may see a rise in
requirements and yet changes in the distribution of employment across jobs -- for example,
reducing the proportion of high-skill jobs -- may help produce an overall reduction in skill
levels. It is important to include measures of skill changes for jobs along with changes in the
distribution of employees across job in order to make that analysis.
The studies of skill in financial service industries have centered on the introduction of new
technologies. The results suggest that new technologies do not necessarily deskill jobs (Adler,
1986, Attewell, 1987), although examples in the practitioner press do find examples of deskilling
operations at local offices (King, 1991, Dauer, 1991).
9 This suggests the importance of
disaggregating the analysis to functional levels where specific technologies might be examined.
There are many different ways to assess changes in the distribution of skill requirements
across jobs. Perhaps the simplest comparison is whether the means are different -- in this case,
whether the average job in a job family or level has a higher or lower evaluation score than in
the past.
Compensation: Finally, we examine changes in compensation across jobs in order to see first
how the income distribution is changing within internal labor markets and second how
compensation changes relate to changes in employment and in skills. There is a general interest
in whether income inequality is changing in the U.S. (Levy and Murnane, 1992), and those
changes are driven at least in part by developments in compensation within firms.
There is a certain amount of determinism in the relationships with pay that are built into the
data. One reason firms have Hay consultants construct these skill measurements for each job
is to relate pay to job requirements. Changes in points should, within the system, lead to
9For additional studies of the effects of technological change on specific jobs in this industry, see Chamot,
1987, Feldberg and Glenn, 1987, Hartmann, et al., 1986, and U.S. Department of Labor, 1990.
9changes in pay. On the other hand, skill requirements and pay should be related in any rational
organization, other things equal, and the Hay system in fact allows the relationship between skill
requirements and pay to vary by company and by job. So examining changes in compensation
with these data will not be identical to examining changes in skill, as the data below will reveal.
Results: Table 1 presents changes in employment, skills, and compensation for each of the
four organizational levels in our sample of firms from 1986 to 1992. With respect to
employment, we see a sharp expansion in the proportion of line workers, absolute declines in
the number of top management positions, and only modest growth in the number of middle
managers and supervisors. As a result, the shape of the organizational chart in these companies
has changed dramatically, becoming considerably flatter. While this result clearly corresponds
to descriptions in the popular press, there have been few analyses before that have documented
it. The “span of control” has increased for every level of the organization and especially for the
first level of management (supervisors). When we asked people in these companies how the
span of control had changed, we were told, “Before, a manager might have 60 subordinates
under her, with two layers of supervision. Now, the manager manages 30 to 40 people directly. ”
Having two additional layers of supervision would have reduced the manager’s span of control
to three or four direct reports -- a drastic difference from 30-40 direct reports. This is certainly
what the numbers show.
The results for skill changes are somewhat different from what descriptions in the popular
press would suggest. If the widening of the supervisory span of control resulted from taking
decision making and responsibility from supervisors and pushing it down to line workers, it does
not seem to have increased the average skill requirements of the exempt line workers. It could
be, for example, that the skill requirements of individual job titles within the “Line” level were
rising as a result of empowerment efforts but that the huge number of new jobs added to the line
category over this period had lower than average skill levels, depressing the average. This
dataset enables us to examine this question more closely, as we can look at the numbers of jobs
added in each functional area and at the average skill levels in those areas. This is discussed
in more detail below when we look at changes by functional area. It could also be that the skill
requirements that are rising from empowerment efforts are for non-exempt workers who are not
included in the sample. Applebaum (cited in Hartmann, et al., 1986), for example, found a
change in one company’s customer service function in the 1980’s that indicated upskilling of
non-exempt workers:
“By 1983, a new, highly skilled clerical position had been designed. Customer service representatives
handle sales, have access to the computer program that assesses risks and to the rating program, explain
rating procedures to customers, answer customer questions, and respond to complaints by telephone or
mail. ”
Skill requirements for the other levels rose over this period, especially for top management
positions. Overall, however, the average level of skill in this sample of firms fell substantially
between 1986 and 1992 -- even though skills were rising in two of the four levels -- because of
a sharp shift in the distribution of employment away from management and toward line
positions. Overall, the average skill requirements for the average job dropped by 17 Hay points
10from 1986 to 1992. A decline of this size is of practical significance. It is the equivalent, for
example, of moving from the top of the range of clerical jobs by skill to the midpoint of that
range. When breaking down the overall change, we find that the change in the distribution of
jobs across levels accounted for a 19 point reduction in average skills, but upskilling of jobs
within levels accounted for a two point increase in skill.
It may be reasonable to wonder how to characterize a situation where the skills of most job
levels are rising even though the average level of skill in the organization is falling; is this an
example of deskilling or upskilling? Perhaps the best description is that it represents upskilling
of individual jobs and deskilling of organizations.
The changes in compensation do not map neatly onto changes in points. None of the levels
experienced increases in skill that were statistically significant, but top managers received a huge
(28 percent) increase in pay, middle managers received a modest (10 percent) increase, and the
lower two levels received virtually no increases. One conclusion from this chart is that earnings
inequality is increasing substantially inside these firms in a manner that is not attributable to any
increases in skill, and the dividing line for that growth in inequality is no longer exempt/non-
exempt but supervisor/manager.
10
One possible explanation for the rising inequality in compensation is that it helps offset
changes in the probability of promotion. Both simple expectancy and tournament models suggest
that the possibility of a promotion to a position with considerably higher pay is an important
source of motivation to employees inside an internal labor market. The fact that the span of
control is increasing and the organizational chart flattening means that the probability of the
average worker being promoted is declining. Other things equal, the decline in the probability
of promotion might reduce the incentives to work hard. Increases in the compensation of top
jobs, in contrast, increase the return to securing a promotion and may offset some of the effect
produced by the decline in the probability of promotion.
There is another explanation: that top managers are in “better positions to legislate their own
pay increases.”
11 If true, this sample of companies may actually underrepresent the true extent
of income inequality in the economy, because it consists of companies using an external
consultant to help set compensation where internal consistency is an important characteristic of
the pay system. Presumably, these companies have a greater interest in the fairness of their
compensation system than do those that do not seek independent advice.
100ne must be careful in making attributions of income inequality based simply on differences in group means.
The dispersion in salary about the mean must also be considered to complete the picture. We calculated gini and thiel
coefficients for the dispersion of salaries over the six-year period and found that the distributions did not change
substantially (1986 Gini: 0.255, Thiel: 0.058; 1992 Gini: 0.243, Thiel: 0.055). Within the management levels, the story
was much the same.
11We thank Frank Levy and Dick Murnane for this observation.
11Conversations with these companies suggest that they may be adapting their compensation
practices to the reduced promotion opportunities associated with flatter organizational structures.
Pay levels may now be somewhat more removed from organizational level. One company gave
the example of two employees who were being considered for promotion, one who had good
people skills and good technical skills, and the other who had good technical skills only. The
one with both sets of skills was promoted to a supervisory position; the other was kept in the
non-supervisor level but given supervisory-level pay and more technical responsibilities.
Developments like these may explain some of the decrease in the gap between the pay of non-
supervisory and supervisory employees.
Changes by Functional Area: Table 2 outlines the change in the distribution of employment
across functional areas. We see a relative shift away from some of the “core” insurance
functions, especially underwriting and actuarial work, in part because of the rise of expert
systems in these areas (see below). We also see some decline in functional areas that are not
part of the “core competence” of insurance operations, such as marketing and accounting. The
biggest gainer is insurance operations, which handle the day to day work of processing insurance
premiums, and then investment and portfolio management, reflecting the increased importance
of investment opportunities to insurance operations during the late 1980s. The deregulation of
parts of the investment industry during the 1980s and the increasing complexity associated with
investments made this function much more important to the organization.
Table 3 presents the changes in employment, skill and pay across those functional areas that
represented at least 1 percent of the jobs in the dataset. In general, we see the same pattern with
respect to hierarchy within functions as with the sample as a whole: there are proportionately
fewer managers in each area, they have higher skills, and they are receiving more pay. Average
skill levels for the function as a whole are down in all but one area while the overall pattern for
pay is mixed.
In general, the organizational chart represented by the distribution of employment across
levels is remarkably similar across functional areas in 1992 (see Table 3A -- bar chart). This
was not the case in 1986 when some areas, like underwriting, were quite “flat” in structure
while others, like insurance operations, were very” steep. ” Much of the variance in the changes
experienced across functional areas in the past six years, therefore, appears to be driven by the
convergence toward a common organizational structure in 1992.
The functions that are gaining the most jobs turn out also to be the functions that, on average,
show the greatest amount of deskilling. This is because the growing functions are seeing most
of the expansion in lower-skilled jobs. Similarly, the functions with the greatest pay increases
overall are those with the slowest growth in employment because average skill is rising the most
in those areas. The one exception is portfolio management which sees a sharp overall increase
both in jobs and in pay. Pay in this area may have been responding to the sharp expansion of
the investment management industry outside of insurance during this period.
12The relationship between supervisors and non-supervisory employees (levels 3 and 4) has
received the most attention in the popular press because of new practices like employee
empowerment and teamwork that are aimed at that level. Changes in the span of control at level
3 account for most of the “flattening” in the overall organizational structure across functions.
Skill levels were up for all the supervisory functions except Marketing—no doubt related to the
more extensive responsibilities associated with supervising more workers. Skill levels declined
in six of the eleven areas for non-supervisory workers, suggesting again that any transferring
of responsibility from supervisors to exempt non-supervisory workers was not sufficient to raise
skills measurably. As noted previously, however, this does not address the question of whether
the skills were transferred down yet another level to the non-exempt, non-supervisory workers.
Our interviews with the companies in this sample suggest that new technology -- specifically,
the use of expert systems -- accounts for some of the variance across functional areas. Expert
systems are computer decision trees that apply the decision rules used by that experienced staff
(experts) to complex decision making processes such as the underwriting decision (Forester and
Morrison, 1994). The system takes all the information on the insurance application and
evaluates it in terms of risk factors, generating decisions about coverage and price.
Underwriting and benefit administration in particular are using expert systems extensively. They
have seen modest increases in the skills of non-supervisory workers (level 4) and the smallest
increases in the span of control for supervisors. Level 4 employees are not necessarily the
targets of expert systems. Some of the skill and decision making of level 4 jobs is built into the
expert systems which are then used by lower-level, often non-exempt, employees. Level 4
workers are then left with the more complicated tasks which raise their average skill levels.
Overall, level 3 (supervisors) had an increase in skill but did not have a correspondingly
significant increase in pay (see Table 1). This can be attributed to changes in the distribution
of jobs across functions: Every area except Marketing experienced increased skill for its
supervisors, but the two areas adding the most supervisors (Data Processing and Benefits
Administration) were also among the lowest-paid, and they helped depress the average increase.
Understanding the Variance Across Firms: A central question raised by the analyses by
function above is whether there are policies and practices that might influence the pattern of
changes. These factors should be most noticeable across firms. As Table 4 shows, there is
considerable variance across firms in the various outcomes considered above. Perhaps that
variance is related to policies and practices that are within the control of the organization. For
example, the companies with more health insurance business have larger benefits administration
staffs. (There are more health insurance claims per policy to be processed than there are life
insurance claims per policy.) We found larger marketing staffs in the companies that used the
branch model of marketing, but we also found larger customer service staffs in these companies.
This suggests that companies that employ their own agents have a stronger involvement in
servicing the policies sold by those agents, while the companies that use the agency model expect
the agents to perform the customer service function as well. We found flatter hierarchies in the
stock companies, suggesting that market pressure is operating to make these firms more
efficient. See Appendix B for additional detail on the firms.
13With a sample of only eleven firms, we are limited in the type of analyses that we can
perform to examine the factors that drive changes in the employment distribution, skill, and pay.
One of the most important ones to examine, however, is the relationship with overall firm
performance. This relationship is complicated because the causation can potentially go in either
direction. We use as a measure of performance the change in the ratio of net gain from
operations after FIT and Dividends to Book Equity. This is basically a Return on Equity
measure. While there are better measures of overall efficiency (see, e.g., Cummins and Zi,
1993), this is the only one that was available for all three types of companies for both 1986 and
1992.
We divide our sample of firms into those where performance was improving during this
period and those where it was declining. There was a clear break between the five firms which
had improved their performance and the six which had declined in performance, with the closest
values to zero being .53 and -.009. We also divided the companies into better performing and
worse performing companies in each year. As noted earlier, all of the companies in our sample
were better than average in performance, so even our “worse” performers are not representative
of the bad firms in the industry.
12 Table 5 presents data on changes in the distribution of
employment, in skills, and in pay for these two groups of firms. The declining group cut 20
percent of its top management jobs, greatly increasing the span of control of middle managers
and supervisors, increased the skill requirements of top jobs by 18 percent (but not of middle
management jobs), and increased the pay of top jobs by 39 percent (but not middle management
or supervisors). In other words, the declining firms concentrated their change efforts on the top
management positions. And as their performance declined, they increased their emphasis on the
top jobs.
What we cannot tell from this simple analysis is which way the causation is running. As the
performance of firms declined, did they shift emphasis toward top management in an effort to
turn things around, or did their performance decline because of that shift in emphasis?
Kendall rank correlations suggest that changes in the administrative ratio -- level two and
three managers to level 4 employees -- are positively and significantly related to increases in
organizational performance between 1986 and 1992, as well as to performance in 1992. The
Kendall’s tau for the correlation between change in administrative ratio and change in
performance was -.6 (Z= -2.415), while the same statistic for the correlation between change
in administrative ratio and performance in 1992 was -.511 (Z=-2.057). This is a potentially
important finding which suggests that reducing the proportion of middle management “overhead”
in an organization is associated with improved performance. Changes in skill and salary did not
reveal any significant effects on performance or on change in performance.
12There seemed to be a break in our sample between ratios of .28 and .52 in 1982, so we divided our “better”
and “worse” firms at this point. Five firms were in the ‘better” category and six were in the “worse” category. In 1992
there was not such a clear break. There were two possible breaks: between .51 and .36 and between .36 and .28. We
selected the first break, deciding that a rate of .50 as the dividing line for both years would be the most interpretable.
14Conclusions
The most important results from this study are the overall findings suggesting that insurance
companies have moved toward a flatter organizational hierarchy, that skill levels are rising for
individual jobs but falling for the organization as a whole (because of shifting employment
toward lower skilled jobs), and that income inequality within the companies is rising. Managers
have fewer promotional opportunities, but those who succeed receive a larger payoff. This
suggests that “management” as a career will remain attractive, albeit less certain in terms of
promotion prospects. Shifts to team-based approaches and the elimination of functional
designations would suggest a greater need for generalists than specialists. As technology such
as expert systems reduces the need for large units of “experts,” the manager’s skill will be in
recognizing when an expert needs to be called. Leadership skills and the ability to adapt to a
changing environment are two qualities that will be sought in the future. Fortunately, these
skills will also be useful to team members who are not selected for promotion to manager.
Increasing income inequality may lead to distrust within the organization, though this may be
offset by the creation of technical tracks that allow highly skilled non-managers to earn
equivalent levels of pay. The fact that insurance companies are relatively unique in facing no
major industry-specific shocks from the outside environment suggests that these results should
translate well to organizations in other industries.
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18Appendix A
In 1986, there were 2,254 life insurance companies in the United States. By 1988, there were 2,343. The next few
years showed decreases in the number of companies (2,270 in 1989, 2,195 in 1990, 2,065 in 1991, and 2005 in 1992),
but the numbers of establishments and employees and the dollar value of the payrolls did not begin to drop as sharply
or as soon. Sales, income, and assets of these companies maintained a steady rise over the same period.
Mutuals have no stockholders and no capital stock. The policyholders own these companies, elect the boards of
directors, and may receive profits as dividends. Stockholders own stock companies, sharing in the profits and losses and
electing the boards of directors. Fraternals have no capital stock, and the activities of these organizations are carried
out for the mutual benefit of the members of the organization. They have representative forms of government. Stock
companies are by far the most common, while fraternals are becoming so uncommon that they are not included in reports
of numbers of life insurance companies. In 1971, there were 150 fraternals providing life insurance, out of 1950
companies.
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992)
Company size has changed as follows over the years:
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992)